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The Burning of Falmouth, 1775 
A Case Study in British Imperial 
Pacification
by Donald A. Yerxa
As Britain’s colonial policy evolved from its emphasis 
on coercive legislation to forceful suppression, the Minis­
try increasingly turned to the Royal Navy as an instru­
ment of implementation. In 1774 the government called 
upon the North American Squadron, which had policed 
colonial waters since 1763, to enforce the Boston Port 
Act. When Anglo-American relations worsened early in 
1775, the Navy was charged with the additional task of 
blockading colonial trade with foreign nations. And 
when open hostilities commenced later that year, British 
naval forces were expected to take an active role in paci­
fying the rebellious colonies. As Commander in Chief of 
the Royal Navy’s North American Squadron, Vice Ad­
miral Samuel Graves had the unenviable responsibility of 
implementing these naval aspects of British imperial 
policy.
Admiral Graves was sixty-one years old when he was 
appointed to command the North American Squadron in 
March 1774. Although he had worked his way up in the 
service by regular promotion, his career to date had not 
been outstanding, and he did not have the reputation of 
a fighter or great administrator.1 Graves did have, how­
ever, the support of the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
Lord Sandwich. Theoretically, selection of the Com­
mander of the North American Squadron was a matter 
for Cabinet consideration, but Sandwich had far more in­
fluence in the selection than the other Cabinet members 
and was able to secure Graves’ nomination over the 
doubts of some of his colleagues.2
Under Samuel Graves’ leadership the North American 
Squadron had been totally ineffective in either isolating 
or pacifying the insurrection. Not only had the squadron 
failed to provide the British forces in Boston with suffici­
ent provisions and supplies, but it had also been humili­
ated by rebel whaleboat activity in Boston harbor and 
by daring rebel attacks on His Majesty’s vessels in other 
ports. The series of embarrassing incidents that occurred 
in the summer of 1775 finally convinced Graves that his 
‘semi-neutral’ conduct had failed. The task of isolating 
and pacifying the colonial rebellion was both enormous 
and unique, and Graves had expected that the British 
government would supply him with detailed directives 
as to how to proceed under these difficult circumstances. 
But by late August he realized that waiting for specific 
orders was fruitless and that he had to resort to much 
more vigorous naval action.
Graves’ orders to his captains reflect this change of atti­
tude. On 10 September 1775, for example, he command­
ed Captain George Vandeput of the Asia to fire on the 
port of New York should its inhabitants refuse to supply 
British vessels. In order to demonstrate that British 
threats were not idle, Graves suggested that Vandeput 
fire first on the house of one ‘Traitor Sear.’3 One week 
later he ordered Captain James Wallace of the Rose “to 
take, burn, sink, and destroy all and every Pirate or Re­
bel [vessel he encountered] . . .And . . to lay waste 
and destroy every Town or Place from whence Pirates 
are fitted out.”4 At last Graves had abandoned his 
‘semi-neutrality’ in favor of an active role for the Navy 
in pacifying the rebellious colonies.
Feeling that the colonial insurgents had taken advan­
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tage of his leniency, Graves initiated a plan to destroy 
some of the more delinquent coastal towns to the north­
east of Boston.5 Writing in 1776, Graves stated that up un­
til the end of August 1775 he had hoped that the Amer­
ican colonies might somehow be reconciled with Great 
Britain. This sentiment in addition to the lack of specific 
orders for his future conduct had caused him to confine 
the Navy’s operations to intercepting rebel contraband, 
guarding supplies intended for British forces and convoy­
ing Army transports. By late August, however, he deter­
mined to wait no longer. Since the Admiral had ex­
perienced negligible success in apprehending smugglers 
and privateers in open water, he now decided to destroy 
their bases of operation—the coastal towns of central 
and eastern New England.6 More importantly, he de­
cided to pacify the insurgency by means of what could 
be regarded as strategic naval bombardment, hoping 
thereby to destroy the colonists’ will to resist.
Admiral Graves shared his plans with General Thomas 
Gage on 1 September. The Admiral listed his reasons for 
taking more vigorous actions: “repeated Insults and Loss­
es His Majesty’s Squadron has sustained . the King’s 
People killed and made Prisoners; Light Houses de­
stroyed, Commerce interrupted, And the Preparations 
for War Daily making in the different Towns.” Graves 
then said that he wanted to “lay Waste such Sea Port 
Towns in the New England Governments as are not like­
ly to be useful to His Majesty’s Stores and to destroy all 
the Vessels within the Harbours.” In order to carry out 
his ambitious design he requested troops, transports and 
artillery from Gage.7 The General displayed neither great 
enthusiasm nor hostility to Graves’ plan, but promised to 
assist the Admiral as much as possible, also informing 
Graves that he could only spare two transports, the Sym­
metry and the Spitfire. Gage expressed his regret that 
“something of this kind” had not been proposed earlier, 
when he might have furnished substantial assistance.8
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Graves later wrote that in September 1775 he was “im­
patient to revenge the Insults shown his Cruizers, and to 
scourge the Inhabitants of these Sea Port Towns/’9 Yet 
he did not propose this pacification scheme merely out 
of revenge; he had additional motivation. Several times 
during the summer of 1775 the First Lord of the British 
Admiralty had sent Graves private memoranda recom­
mending that his protege assume a more vigorous role in 
pacifying the rebellion. In late July Lord Sandwich ad­
vised Graves to exert himself “to the utmost towards 
crushing the rebellion . [without] delicacies.” The 
First Lord hinted that censure could easily result from in­
activity but never from “doing too much/’10 Other 
insinuations that Samuel Graves’ position as commander 
of British naval forces in North American waters was in 
jeopardy continued that summer. In a private letter 
dated 25 August 1775 Sandwich bluntly informed Graves 
of the existence of numerous complaints, originating in 
the colonies but finding strong reverberations in Britain, 
that the North American Squadron was in essence doing 
nothing to suppress the rebellion. Lord Sandwich pa­
tronizingly reminded Graves that only through the form­
er’s efforts at persuasion and manipulation was the latter 
in retention of his command. Without suggesting any spe­
cific naval measures, Sandwich begged Graves to supply 
him with some evidence that he was making the insur­
gents feel “the weight of an English fleet/’11
News of Lexington and Concord had convinced all the 
Cabinet members, except Lord Dartmouth, of the neces­
sity for vigorous use of military and naval force in pacify­
ing the colonies. Although the strategic goals of Britain’s 
policy of imperial pacification were still in the process of 
definition, the realization that a show of force would be 
necessary was now apparent.12 Essentially, Sandwich 
was warning Admiral Graves of the new attitude in 
Ministry. Although impossible to document completely, 
the assumption that Graves’ proposed expedition was in 
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large part a response to Sandwich’s proddings seems rea­
sonable. Naval bombardment of coastal towns was a 
means of implementing a ‘get tough’ approach to the 
problem of imperial pacification, while at the same time 
providing Lord Sandwich with the evidence necessary to 
secure the Admiral’s command from the intentions of his 
critics.
Despite increasing lack of cooperation from General 
Gage and the absence of definite orders from the Ad­
miralty, Admiral Graves proceeded with preparations for 
a coastal expedition.13 The transports Symmetry and Spit­
fire required considerable repair and carpentry work, 
since they were to be armed with mortars and howitzers. 
Graves assigned all the carpenters and caulkers of his 
squadron to work on these two ships.14 During this time 
of preparation the personal dispute between Graves and 
Gage flared up again. The Admiral complained that 
Gage interfered with the preparations by making it diffi­
cult for the Navy to obtain mortar shells and other 
stores.15 Writing to a relative in Parliament, Graves 
charged that General Gage desired “to stamp upon 
[him] . the imputation of negligence.” Yet Graves as­
sured his relative that for the sake of his country he 
would maintain the “Appearance of civility . . with 
the Commander of Land if possible.”16
Whatever fears and reservations Samuel Graves may 
still have had on the matter of exceeding his authority by 
sending out a coastal bombardment expedition were al­
layed on 4 October with the belated arrival of the British 
sloop Raven, which carried new formal directives from 
the Admiralty.17 The Lords Commissioners of the Ad­
miralty informed Graves of George Ill’s “firm Resolution 
that every measure be pursued for suppressing by the 
most vigorous Efforts by Sea & Land, this unnatural 
Rebellion.” They directed Admiral Graves to carry on 
such operations in New England waters as Graves 
deemed “most effectual for suppressing . . the Rebel­
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lion.” In addition to this broad, discretionary directive 
the Admiralty ordered Graves to signify publicly to all 
coastal towns that should violence be committed against 
any British official or loyalist, should men be armed and 
raised, should any military works be erected or should 
any attempt be made to seize or destroy British supply 
and ammunition magazines, “it will be the duty of 
[Graves’ squadron] . . to proceed, by the most vigor­
ous efforts, against the said Town, as in open Rebellion 
against the King.”18
This Admiralty Office communication, which originat­
ed from Lord Dartmouth, was strikingly similar to Dart­
mouth’s letter to General Gage of 27 January 1775, which 
Gage interpreted as his marching orders in Massachu­
setts. In the latter Dartmouth wrote some strongly 
worded passages but balanced them with ’saving 
clauses,’ reminding Gage of the discretionary nature of 
his instructions.19 Likewise, Graves’ orders of 6 July con­
tained some very severe directives, and certainly the spir­
it of his instructions was belligerent. Yet Graves also was 
left with a large degree of discretion as to how to imple­
ment these directives. To be sure, the fact that it would 
be impossible and even foolish for the Colonial Office to 
issue minutely detailed orders to commanders in distant 
North America would account for the discretionary na­
ture of the orders to Gage and Graves. Yet these broad 
directives could also neatly be used to shift the blame 
for any unpopular action against the colonists from the 
Ministry to the Army and Navy commanders serving in 
America.
Although the orders brought by the Raven were not as 
specific as he had wished, Admiral Graves judged that 
their general spirit justified his coastal expedition. The 
Admiral expressed his pleasure that the Admiralty’s or­
ders “coincided exactly with what was then doing.”20 Af­
ter the arrival of the Raven Graves’ tentative proposal 
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coalesced into a definite naval operation with specific ob­
jectives. Admiral Graves selected Lieutenant Henry 
Mowat of the Canceaux to command the expedition. At 
forty-one years of age, Mowat had about fifteen years 
experience in New England waters. Since 1764 he had 
been employed on a survey of the New England coast. 
Graves obviously chose Lieutenant Mowat to command 
the mission because of his intimate knowledge of the 
coast and his experience in dealing with some of the 
coastal towns.21
On 6 October 1775 Admiral Graves issued his orders 
to Lieutenant Mowat. Informing him that the expedition 
was designed to “chastize” the towns of Marblehead, 
Salem, Newburyport, Cape Ann, Ipswich, Portsmouth, 
Saco, Falmouth and Machias, Graves ordered Mowat to 
sail to as many of these communities as possible, making 
“the most vigourous Efforts to burn the Towns, and de­
stroy the Shipping in the Harbours.” The Admiral indi­
cated that Cape Ann and Machias, which had been the 
scenes of very embarrassing incidents involving Navy 
vessels, were especially to be objects of retribution.22 
Graves cautioned Mowat not to risk the lives of his men 
by attempting an occupation at any of the towns. Rath­
er, Mowat was to be content with “falling upon the Re­
bels, doing what [he could] with Expedition and coming 
away before they . . [could] assemble to cut off your
Retreat.” Graves told Lieutenant Mowat to differentiate, 
where possible, between loyalists and rebels, protecting 
and defending the former while punishing the latter. The 
Admiral added one last warning. The intent of the 
expedition was punishing the rebels and thereby hopeful­
ly breaking their will to resist, but under no circum­
stance was Mowat to permit plundering of any sort. 
Graves made it clear that he would deal harshly with 
anyone caught in such activity. As to the duration of the 
operation and the specific means of destruction, Lieuten­
ant Mowat was given some latitude, but both men under­
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stood that naval bombardment was the less risky and 
more spectacular means of making the population “feel 
the weight of an English fleet/’23 Admiral Graves also is­
sued orders to all other Navy captains stationed in New 
England waters, informing them of Mowat’s expedition 
and ordering them to assist it whenever possible.24
Lieutenant Mowat’s squadron sailed from Nantasket 
on 8 October on what was to be Admiral Graves’ first 
and only significant naval operation during his eighteen 
month tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the North 
American Squadron. The small flotilla consisted of the 
flagship Canceaux, an armed ship of eight guns; the 
schooner Halifax, a newly-built vessel of six guns; the 
Symmetry, an armed transport outfitted with mortars 
and howitzers; and the Spitfire, an armed sloop also 
carrying mortars and howitzers.25 The four vessels repre­
sented only a small increment of the total strength of the 
North American Squadron, which by this time consisted 
of betw een thirty and forty vessels.26 Mowat also carried 
one hundred men commanded by Captain Forster of the 
Royal Marines.27
Admiral Graves, attempting to keep the intention and 
destination of the expedition a secret, even ordered the 
stores for Mowat’s flotilla to be loaded quietly at night.28 
Nevertheless, the Americans received intelligence reports 
from Boston that an expeditionary force had been pre­
pared and had sailed for some destination to the east­
ward. One Bostonian’s diary entry for 3 October men­
tioned the departure of several armed vessels from Bos­
ton’s inner harbor on a secret mission, which was ru­
mored to be directed at Cape Ann.29 George Washing­
ton, then commanding colonial forces surrounding Bos­
ton, received exaggerated intelligence that on 3 October 
a large fleet carrying six hundred men departed Boston. 
Since Washington’s informer made special note of the 
fact that the British vessels carried mortars, howitzers 
and other artillery, Washington concluded that the ‘fleet’ 
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intended to bombard some coastal town. By 13 October 
Washington knew that the expedition’s destination was 
some town or towns to the eastward of Boston.30
Meanwhile, Mowat’s squadron encountered very 
stormy weather during its first few days at sea, delaying 
its arrival at the first objective, Cape Ann, until 11 Octo­
ber. The Lieutenant maneuvered his vessels close to 
shore but did not attack the town. Lieutenant Grant, the 
expedition’s artillery officer,31 felt that Cape Ann’s build­
ings were too widely scattered for effective naval bom­
bardment, especially considering the limited number of 
available carcasses—hollow iron cases filled with com­
bustibles.32 Mowat, eager to make a smart showing on 
his first attempt and equally anxious not to supply the 
provincials with the further encouragement that an unsuc­
cessful bombardment would provide, accepted Grant’s 
advice and departed “not without reluctance” for an­
other port.33
The next morning a strong northwesterly wind carried 
the flotilla past Newburyport, Ipswich, Portsmouth and 
Saco to a point off Cape Elizabeth, just south of Fal­
mouth in Casco Bay.34 Once again stormy autumnal 
weather hindered the expedition’s progress. The vessels 
were forced to seek shelter at Boothbay Harbor and re­
mained there three days. On 16 October the small squad­
ron left Boothbay Harbor and anchored at the mouth of 
Falmouth’s harbor.35
The objective now at the mercy of the British vessels 
was eastern New England’s most important seaport and 
former site of the most remote of the British custom­
houses in New England. Falmouth was a small commer­
cial town of two- and three-story buildings nestled close­
ly together near the tip of a narrow three mile long 
peninsula that jutted out into island-dotted Casco Bay.36 
Her nearly two thousand inhabitants generally were con­
nected in some manner with maritime enterprises: mast 
and lumber exporting, shipbuilding or maritime trade. In 
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1768, for example, Falmouth had exported over four mil­
lion feet of pine boards, almost ten times that of Ports­
mouth-Kittery and Boston combined.37 And in 1773 Fal­
mouth residents owned 2,550 tons of shipping.38
The town of Falmouth had long established itself as a 
community in opposition to the British metropolitan gov­
ernment. Such opposition had frequently been mani­
fested in various overt acts of disobedience. Falmouth’s 
militancy dated from January 1766, when a mob burned 
the town’s allotment of stamped papers provided for in 
the Stamp Act.39 In August 1767 Francis Waldo, a cus­
toms official, seized a quantity of rum and sugar belong­
ing to a Falmouth resident because of a breach of reven­
ue legislation. A mob soon gathered and attacked the 
house of the customs comptroller, Arthur Savage. Upon 
finding Waldo a guest in the Savage home, the mob de­
tained the two men, while another group broke into the 
customhouse and removed the confiscated goods to safe­
ty.40 Two men were jailed for their part in the proceed­
ings, but once again a mob came to the rescue and aided 
them in their escape. Three years later a group of Fal­
mouth inhabitants attacked the unpopular Savage be­
cause of his zeal in enforcing the despised revenue 
laws.41 When tea ships arrived in Boston in 1773, the peo­
ple of Falmouth resolved in a town meeting not to buy 
or sell any East India tea until the duty was repealed.42 
On 14 June 1774 bells tolled all day in a demonstration 
of Falmouth’s sympathy with the plight of Boston with 
its port closed by the British.43 Thus by 1775 Falmouth 
had acquired a reputation of being “Boston’s younger sis­
ter in rebellion.’’44
During the first half of 1775 two incidents had rein­
forced this reputation: The Gaspee desertion incident 
and Thompson’s W ar. In February four seamen deserted 
the British Xavy brig Gaspee which was anchored in Fal­
mouth harbor. Lieutenant Hunter, commander of the 
brig, felt that sending a boat ashore to recapture these
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men would be too risky, since some Falmouthers had 
threatened to destroy the Gaspee or any other British ves­
sel that attempted to remove the deserters. Hunter there­
upon sailed to Boston where Admiral Graves immediate­
ly ordered him back to Falmouth to obtain the sailors 
and to check “the Insolence of threatning the King’s 
Ships, by assuring them that if they committed any act 
of violence against . . his Majesty’s Officers or Sea­
men or destroyed any of the King’s Stores, 
that . . [Samuel Graves] would take the severest mea­
sures to distress them the Law would allow.” Hunter 
made Graves’ threat known to the people of Falmouth. 
They replied politely to Lieutenant Hunter’s communica­
tion and permitted British sailors to come ashore “with­
out being insulted.” The deserters, however, had left the 
town.45
The Thompson’s War incident in the spring of 1775 
also magnified Falmouth’s revolutionary reputation, if 
not among other colonists, at least in Admiral Graves’ 
mind. This rather complicated incident began on 2 
March 1775 when the merchant sloop John and Mary ar­
rived in Falmouth, Maine, from Bristol, England, with 
rigging, sails and stores for a ship being built by Thomas 
Coulson, a Falmouth merchant. Since Coulson’s ship was 
being built for a Bristol merchant, the local Committee 
of Inspection convened to ascertain whether Coulson 
was violating the Continental Association.46 The Com­
mittee decided that Coulson’s unloading of rigging and 
sails from the John and Mary and appropriation of them 
to outfit his new ship with the intention of sending that 
ship to England would constitute a violation of the As­
sociation. Consequently, the Committee ordered the Fal­
mouth merchant to send the supplies back promptly.47 
Coulson stalled, maintaining that the John and Mary 
needed repairs and was unfit to put to sea. The Fal­
mouth Committee consulted a group of ships’ carpen­
ters, riggers and caulkers on the matter and, based on 
129
their opinion, gave Coulson until 14 March to repair the 
sloop and send her back to Bristol. When on 15 March 
the John and Mary was still in port, the Committee, in 
accordance with the Continental Association, publicly 
proclaimed Thomas Coulson a violator of the Associa­
tion.48
Meanwhile, Falmouth’s loyalist sheriff, William Tyng, 
had written to General Gage for assistance. Gage in turn 
handed the matter over to Admiral Graves.49 Graves 
promptly ordered Lieutenant Henry Mowat in the armed 
ship Canceaux to Falmouth in order to assist Coulson.50 
Mowat arrived in Falmouth early in April. But despite 
Mowat’s presence, Coulson could not hire enough men 
to help him unload the Bristol sloop. It therefore took 
over one month to prepare Coulson’s new ship.51
During that month the Canceaux's presence in Fal­
mouth harbor caused considerable uneasiness for the 
town’s patriots. W hen a small tender arrived to supply 
Mowat, the town was thrown into panic.52 On 30 April a 
diarist wrote that Falmouth’s inhabitants were “continual­
ly disquieted, apprehensive that [Falmouth] . . . and 
the whole country are inevitably and entirely ruined.”53 
The sense of uneasiness was also experienced by the 
town’s loyalist population. On 24 April several “Friends 
to the British Constitution,” fearful of. some rebel plot to 
confine them, sought refuge onboard the Canceaux. Fal­
mouth’s customs officials complained that as soon as 
Mowat left they would risk losing their records, effects, 
and quite possibly their lives. These officials begged 
their superiors in Boston to apply to Gage and Graves 
for protecting them when Mowat left.54 And on 2 May a 
group of eighteen prominent Falmouth loyalists peti­
tioned Lieutenant Mowat to remain in port until they 
could notify Gage and Graves of their situation. They 
too stated their profound fears that once Mowat left they 
would be “prey to the Sons of Rapine and lawless Vio­
lence.”55
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To add to the tension, rumors circulated that a group 
of Brunswick radicals were preparing to come to Fal­
mouth to attack the Canceaux.56 The Falmouth Com­
mittee of Correspondence, feeling that any such attempt 
would lay “a foundation for the destruction” of the 
town, wrote to the Brunswick Committee, requesting 
that they prevent an attack on Mowat. In addition they 
wrote to Colonel Samuel Thompson, leader of the radi­
cals, asking him to desist. Thompson replied that he had 
dropped his plans to come to Falmouth.57
Contrary to his reply, Colonel Thompson landed with 
about sixty men on the back side of Falmouth Neck on 7 
May. His band of backwoods patriots concealed them­
selves in a thick stand of trees for two days. But on 9 
May they seized Mowat, Reverend Wiswell (the local 
Anglican minister) and a Navy surgeon as the group took 
a leisurely walk in the woods.58 As soon as the Can­
ceaux s master, Ensign Hogg, heard of this, he informed 
the inhabitants of Falmouth that if Mowat and the others 
were not released shortly, he would fire on the town. To 
dramatize the ultimatum, Hogg fired two blank shots at 
the town. One witness recalled the effect of Hogg’s ulti­
matum on the inhabitants of Falmouth:
You can hardly conceive the consternation, confusion, and uproar 
that immediately ensued. Our women were, I believe, every one of 
them in tears, or praying, or screaming; widows [were] hurrying 
their goods into countrymen’s carts, never asking their names, though 
strangers, and carrying their children out of Town. Some per­
sons bed-rid, or in childbed, were hastily removed, with no small dan­
ger of their lives.59
Many Falmouth citizens begged Thompson to release 
the men. Some loyalists apparently even called for Fal­
mouth’s militia to rescue Mowat from the Brunswick 
men. Most inhabitants, however, tried to remain neutral 
and attempted to save their homes. Colonel Thompson 
was unwilling to deliver his prisoners, insisting that there 
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was “open and settled war between the Colonies and Bri­
tain/' But he soon realized that the whole town opposed 
his methods.60 Thompson then consented to free Mowat 
and the others for the night, if they promised to return 
the next morning at which time some sort of settlement 
could be arranged.61 Promises were made, and Mowat, 
expressing his gratitude to the townspeople for their ef­
forts on his behalf, returned to the Canceaux.62
All through the night militiamen from outlying settle­
ments converged on Falmouth. When Mowat failed to 
come ashore in the morning, these men became quite 
rowdy.63 Lieutenant Mowat sent word that he had fully 
intended to honor his promise, but that earlier in the 
morning he had been informed of threats on his life.64 
The officers of the various militia companies formed a 
committee to plan their next move. The committee 
voted to destroy the Canceaux, but they remained unde­
cided as how to do it. The militia officers then instituted 
a kangaroo court of sorts, hauling in suspected loyalists 
and extorting money from them. On 11 May a mob of 
militiamen broke into Thomas Coulson’s house and used 
it as a headquarters. Finding a quantity of New England 
rum in the cellar, a great many of them became drunk. 
One Calvin Lombard, “being raised with liquor,” went 
down to the wharves and fired a musket at the Can- 
ceaux. Mowat threatened to fire on the town because of 
this, and once again Falmouth’s residents panicked.65 Not 
only was a British naval vessel threatening to bombard 
the town, but also Falmouth was host to several compan­
ies of rowdy and sometimes drunken militia.
By 12 May the rural militia finally drifted back home. 
The departing radicals had only unkind remarks for Fal­
mouth’s inhabitants. Some militiamen apparently stated 
that Lieutenant Mowat should have bombarded the 
town. For their part, the people of Falmouth felt that 
Colonel Thompson planned the whole affair to humble 
Falmouth “for its arrogance in sending a message to 
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Thompson . . to dissuade him from taking the ships 
[Canceaux and Coulson’s new ship].”66 The incident, 
known as ‘Thompson’s W ar,’ ended on 15 May when 
Mowat received the following communication from the 
people of Falmouth: “the Town disapproved of the pro­
ceedings of the armed body, but . we were unable 
to resist them.” The same day the Canceaux and Coul- 
ton’s ship, the Minerva, weighed anchor and sailed for 
Portsmouth.67
During Colonel Thompson’s occupation the Falmouth 
Committee wrote to the Massachusetts Committee of 
Safety, complaining of Thompson’s “rash and Injudici­
ous, if not unjustifiable” attempt to take the Canceaux. 
The Falmouth Committee objected to the militia’s rowdi­
ness and their extortion of funds from local loyalists. 
Also the Committee advised that future operations 
against the British should be conducted by proper offi­
cers in an orderly fashion, “lest it should occasion a civil 
War Among ourselves.” The Falmouth Committee men­
tioned that Thompson’s action would probably arouse 
Admiral Graves.68 This was indeed the case, for the Gas- 
pee incident and Thompson’s War, according to Graves, 
caused Falmouth’s inclusion on the list of seaport towns 
to be ‘pacified’ by Mowat.69
Despite the events of Thompson’s War, Falmouth con­
tinued to uphold the patriotic cause. Falmouth raised a 
militia to fight for the revolutionary cause. In addition 
the town frequently shipped supplies on coastal schoon­
ers to Newburyport, avoiding Graves’ blockade around 
Boston. From Newburyport they were transported over­
land to the insurgent forces surrounding Boston. This ac­
tivity had not gone unnoticed, however, and the town of 
Falmouth would shortly pay a dear price for its patriotic 
inclinations.70
The appearance of Lieutenant Mowat’s vessels on 16 
October 1775 did not create any great consternation in 
Falmouth. Because the inhabitants surmised that the 
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small squadron was merely on a foraging expedition in 
search of livestock and other stores for British forces in 
Boston, the only defensive measure taken was the dis­
patch of a good percentage of the Falmouth militia to is­
lands in Casco Bay in order to protect the town s live­
stock and hay.71 The four British ships spent most of 17 
October fighting a strong wind as they proceeded to 
form a line directly abreast of the compact part of the 
town. The sight of the1 squadron working its way oppo­
site the town greatly alarmed the townspeople. Many be­
gan to transport their belongings to areas safely outside 
of Falmouth. Yet one resident, Daniel "fucker, recalled 
that this alarm subsided when Falmouth’s residents 
learned that Henry Mowat commanded the force.72 They 
believed that Mowat would not forget the efforts they 
had made to secure his release during Thompson’s War.
As soon as the flotilla anchored abreast of the town 
late in the afternoon, Lieutenant Mowat sent his junior of­
ficer, Lieutenant Frasier, ashore with a written message 
for the people of Falmouth. A crowd of curious resi­
dents met him dockside and followed the naval officer 
to the town’s meetinghouse. There Frasier delivered the 
message to a lawyer who read it before a large audi­
ence.73 This communication summarized the town’s of­
fenses and informed the townspeople of Admiral Craves’ 
order to execute a “just Punishment.”
After so many premeditated attacks on the legal Prerogatives of the 
best of Sovereigns. After the repeated Instances you have experienced 
in Britain’s long forbearance of the Bod of Correction; and the Merci­
ful and Paternal extension of her Hands to embrace you, again and 
again; have been regarded as vain and nugatory. And in place of a 
dutiful and grateful return to your King and Parent State; you have 
been guilty of the most unpardonable Rebellion, supported by tin* 
Ambition of a set of designing men, whoso insidious views have 
brought the whole into the same Dilemma; which leads me to feel not 
a little for the Innocent of them, in particular on the present occasion, 
having it in orders to Execute a just Punishment on the Town of Pal- 
mouth. In the name of which Authority I previously warn you to re­
move without delay the Human Species out of the said town; for 
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which purpose I give you the time of two hours; at the period of 
which, a Red pendant will be hoisted at the Maintopgallant Masthead 
with a gun: but should your imprudence lead you to show the least re­
sistance, you will in that case free me of that Humanity, so strongly 
pointed out in m\’ orders as well as my own Inclination. I also ob­
serve that all those who upon a former occasion [during Thompson’s 
War] fly to the King’s Ship under my Command for Protection, that 
same door is now open and ready to receive them.74
The people were stunned. Mowat’s ultimatum was no­
thing less than a declaration of war. Reverend Jacob Bail­
ey, a loyalist eyew itness, noted that “a frightful consterna­
tion ran through the assembly, every heart was seized 
with terror, every countenance change colour, and a pro­
found silence ensued for several moments.”75 After a sec­
ond reading Lieutenant Frasier, obviously cognizant of 
the delicacy of the situation, declared his willingness to 
convey any message to Mowat. The inhabitants of Fal­
mouth decided to send an ad hoc committee of dis­
tinguished citizens—Jediah Preble, Nathaniel Coffin and 
Robert Pagan—to deal with Lieutenant Mow at personal­
ly.76 Once on board the Canceaux the committee de­
manded to know’ the nature of the “just Punishment." 
Mowat, they claimed, informed them that his orders 
were to “bum, sink, and destroy." He asserted that the 
town’s crimes did not give it “the least right to expect 
any lenity." Further, Mowat stated that in sending his 
communication to the people of Falmouth he risked his 
commission, since Admiral Graves did not authorize the 
giving of any w arning to the tow nspeople. The three Fal­
mouth men protested against the severity of Graves' or­
ders and pleaded w ith Mowat to spare the town or at 
least grant additional time to allow’ the inhabitants to re­
move some of their effects. At length Mow at, out of the 
“known humanity of the British nation," offered a com­
promise. If the residents of Falmouth w ould deliver all 
their arms and ammunition to the British, he w’ould defer 
from executing his orders until an express could be sent 
to Boston to obtain further instructions from Admiral 
Graves.77
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The ad hoc committee replied that they would com­
municate Mowat’s offer to the town. Yet they added that 
to educate the whole town of Mowat’s proposal and then 
to reach a decision was impossible all in the same even­
ing. Realizing that the day was nearly spent, the Lieuten­
ant agreed to postpone any action until 8:00 A.M. the 
next day, 18 October, if a token number of small arms 
were delivered to him presently. If his demand for the 
surrender of all arms and ammunition was not met at 
that time, he would commence bombardment promptly 
at 9:00 A.M. The British officer also warned that if 
he perceived “the lest hostile appearnce of any kind 
whatsoever” he could consider his offer void and act 
accordingly.78
Preble, Coffin and Pagan returned to shore and in­
formed the townspeople of Lieutenant Mowat’s terms. 
The people of Falmouth unalterably opposed the surren­
der of all their arms and ammunition but also realized 
that expediency dictated the prompt delivery of a few 
muskets. The ad hoc committee sent the muskets to the 
Canceaux with a message that the town would meet ear­
ly the next morning and would send their final answer to 
Mowat by 8:00 A.M.79
The inhabitants spent the next twelve hours in frantic 
efforts to save as many personal possessions as possible. 
Reverend Bailey recalled that women and children ran 
out of town, and the aged and ill left their habitations.80 
The fortunate secured horse or oxen teams to haul their 
goods to neighboring towns or to a sheltered area on the 
far side of town, well out of range of the British guns. 
One merchant secured two teams of horses and loaded 
his wagons with as much as he could. He then loaded a 
barge with W est Indian warehouse goods, sending it 
around Falmouth Xeck to safety.81 But a shortage of 
available teams hindered the efforts of many.82 And to 
add to Falmouth’s troubles, some companies of rural mili­
tia arrived in town during the evening hours, supposedly 
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announcing that if the town complied with the British, 
they would burn it to the ground themselves. In order to 
prevent any possible provocation by these militiamen a 
number of Falmouth volunteers policed the streets until 
daylight.83
When the sun rose on the morning of 18 October, the 
task of removing possessions was far from complete. Peo­
ple trying to save what they could still scurried through 
Falmouth’s streets.84 Whether the people of Falmouth ac­
tually did meet that morning to consider Mowat’s offer 
is impossible to ascertain from the extant accounts. The 
ad hoc committee’s report stated that the townspeople 
did convene early in the morning and decided not to sur­
render their arms to the British.85 Yet in Lieutenant Mo­
wat’s report to Admiral Graves this same committee al­
legedly reported to Mowat that “to their no small aston­
ishment . no part of the inhabitants assembled in the 
morning and that the w hole tow n w as then in the great­
est confusion writh many women and children still re­
maining in it.”86 Other accounts do not mention such a 
meeting, but only relate the frantic efforts of the popu­
lace in removing their private effects.87 At any rate, whe­
ther by default or formal decision, the people of Fal­
mouth refused to surrender their arms. Preble, Coffin 
and Pagan once again visited Mowat and tried to stall 
for more time. They managed to remain onboard the 
Canceaux until 8:30 A.M., but Mowat finally tired of 
their delaying tactics and gave them one half hour to 
clear the town.88
At 9:40 A.M. on the “calm clear and pleasant” autumn 
morning of 18 October 1775 a seaman hoisted a flag 
atop the Canceaux’s maintopgallant masthead. The flag 
signaled the commencement of a severe naval bombard­
ment w7hich lasted about eight hours and left most of Fal­
mouth in ashes. Despite Mowat’s repeated warnings, 
many people remained in the tow n, risking their lives to 
save more of their belongings. The British aimed their
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first shots high to further warn these inhabitants. The ini­
tial shots “struck . . [the] multitude into instant alarm 
and amazement/’ Oxen that were being used in these en­
deavors became “terrified at the smoak and report of the 
guns [and] ran with precipitation over the rocks, dashing 
everything in pieces, and scattering large quantities of 
goods about the streets.’’89 The four British vessels then 
hurled a “horrible shower of balls, . bombs, car­
casses, live shells, grapeshot, and [even] musket balls” 
from their howitzers, mortars and cannon.90
Because of the poor quality of the ammunition, a stiff 
wind blowing away from the town and the makeshift ef­
forts of the inhabitants to extinguish fires, the cannon 
balls and carcasses had relatively little effect during the 
first several hours of the cannonade, outside of the tre­
mendous and incessant roar of their report.91 This con­
vinced Mowat of the necessity of sending landing parties 
ashore to set fire to the many structures and vessels that 
were escaping destruction. Mowat organized a few land­
ing parties totalling thirty seamen and marines under the 
command of Lieutenant Frasier. These parties landed 
ashore at 3:00 P.M., set fire to a considerable number of 
buildings and rowed back to the flotilla by 4:00 P.M.92 
One Falmouth resident recalled that the British “landed 
in their boats from all their vessels at the same moment 
and threw their torches into the doors and windows of 
the houses and stores.”93
Although a considerable number of colonial militia 
had gathered in the Falmouth area, the British landing 
parties faced only unorganized skirmishing.94 Small 
groups of militiamen ran down from positions of safety 
overlooking the town and fired a few shots at the British. 
For all its rhetoric of the last several months, the rural 
militia only wounded two of the attackers.95 According 
to Falmouth’s selectmen this skirmishing saved from 
twenty-five to thirty-five percent of the town’s struc­
tures.96 But undoubtedly, any form of concerted resis­
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tance against the landing forces could have saved more. 
The defenders of Falmouth did not even attempt to at­
tack Mowat’s flotilla because of a lack of powder and us­
able artillery.97
The effect of the landing parties, a change in the direc­
tion of the wind and the constant bombardment caused 
the conflagration to spread. Reverend Bailey wrote a vi­
vid description of the scene:
Bombs and carcasses armed with destruction and streaming with 
fire blazed dreadful through the air, and descended with flaming ven­
geance on the defenceless buildings The crackling of the
flames, the falling of the houses, the bursting of shells, the heavy thun­
der of the cannon threw the elements into frightful noise and commo­
tion, and occasioned the very foundations of surrounding nature to 
quake and tremble. Now lengthening pyramids of fire ascended hor­
ribly bright from the dissolving structures, and the inhabitations of 
pride, vanity, and affluence crumbled to ashes, while their late posses­
sors beheld the shocking appearance with a mixture of astonishment 
and humble indignation.98
By sunset when the firing ceased, “the body of the 
town was in one flame.”99 Mowat’s flotilla then weighed 
anchor and departed the harbor, leaving Falmouth “a 
melancholy heap of ruins.”100 Since the wind had died 
down, the vessels’ progress was slow. This afforded the 
colonials an opportunity to fire their muskets at the Brit­
ish ships. Although the vessels took a few hours to 
maneuver beyond the Americans’ range, the musketry 
did no damage.101 Before he left, Mowat offered the 
town’s loyalists free passage to Boston. None left be­
cause they feared being shot by the rebels if they at­
tempted to board the British vessels. Also they were re­
luctant to leave behind whatever personal possessions sur­
vived.102
Approximately three fourths of Falmouth’s buildings 
were destroyed in the conflagration. The British com­
pletely devastated the lower and compact end of town; 
almost every store or warehouse was consumed. St.
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Paul’s Episcopal Church, a new courthouse, the old meet­
inghouse, the public library, a distillery and nearly all the 
wharves were destroyed. The town lost about 130 dwell­
ings which had housed 160 families.103 Few structurally 
sound buildings remained. Many were so damaged that 
they could not be occupied by their owners. The bom­
bardment, for example, completely ruined the front of 
the town’s new meetinghouse.104
Falmouth lost more than buildings. Upon arriving in 
the harbor on the 16th, Mowat had trapped thirteen ves­
sels in port, several having valuable cargoes onboard. 
Mowat captured two as they attempted to escape; the 
others were destroyed in the bombardment.105 Despite 
their frenzied attempts to remove their belongings, the 
people of Falmouth also lost substantial amounts of per­
sonal possessions. The selectmen estimated that only one 
half of the town’s movable goods survived the bombard­
ment.106 Although much of the loss was from the actual 
cannonade, some loyalists claimed that colonial radicals 
stole many of their personal effects. One loyalist stated 
that since wagon teams were unavailable, he spent the 
several hours before the bombardment removing his 
furniture and goods to his garden. He complained that 
“a good deal was Stolefn] and the most of the remainder 
broken or torn in pieces.”107 The loyalist Reverend Bail­
ey claimed in his inimitable style that “a multitude of vil­
lains were purloining their [Falmouth residents’, especial­
ly loyalists’] goods and carrying them into the country be­
yond the reach of justice.” Bailey stated that more was 
ravished by the “hands of barbarous rapine, than con­
sumed by the unrelenting rapacity of the 
flames ”108
Falmouth officials estimated the total loss in buildings, 
personal estate and cartage to be nearly £55,000.109 This 
figure does not begin to measure the suffering and incon­
venience. Even Reverend Bailey, who did not censure 
Mowat’s action, lamented over the destitution of many 
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families “who twenty-four hours before enjoyed in tran­
quility their commodious habitations, [and] were 
now . . . destitute of a hut and as a tedious winter 
was approaching they had before them a most gloomy 
and distressing prospect/410 In one instance twenty-three 
people were forced to inhabit a single small dwelling, 
with three beds in the kitchen.111 The people of Fal­
mouth were indeed destitute. Not only had they lost 
their homes and many of their possessions, but also their 
means of employment. Throughout the winter of 
1775-1776 their very survival depended upon charity.112
During the course of the bombardment the British 
squadron had fired an estimated three thousand rounds 
of shot plus a number of carcasses and bombs into the 
town.113 Miraculously no one was killed on either side. 
The Americans claimed to have killed several men in the 
landing parties, but Lieutenant Mowat’s report to Ad­
miral Graves revealed that none were killed and only 
two men were slightly wounded.114 Mowat did lose a 
few men by desertion. Stating that he chose to fight for 
the colonists’ cause, one member of a landing party, 
John Armstrong, voluntarily surrendered himself to a 
group of colonial militia.115 Three of the Halifax's sea­
men deserted at North Yarmouth, Maine, while Mowat’s 
flotilla anchored there after leaving Falmouth. All three 
had been pressed into the Royal Navy and had eagerly 
awaited their first opportunity to desert.116
Lieutenant Mowat decided to terminate the coastal 
expedition after the destruction of only one of the nine 
designated towns. The prolonged cannonade caused con­
siderable indirect damage to the British ships. One ves­
sel, the Spitfire, sustained enough damage from the con­
cussion of her howitzers to cause Mowat to fear for her 
seaworthiness. Moreover, the small squadron had ex­
pended nearly all its ammunition, and many of the men 
were ill and unable to perform their duties.117 In fact the 
master of the Halifax died of smallpox a few weeks after 
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the Falmouth affair, and Admiral Graves quarantined the 
whole crew as a precautionary measure.118
Before heading back to Boston, Mowat drafted a de­
tailed report to Admiral Graves. In it he expressed no 
sympathetic emotions for Falmouth's inhabitants. In­
stead, he stated his deep concern and anger over the 
poor performance of the artillery stores and the condi­
tion of his ships and men. In fact a hint of an apologetic 
attitude for not having executed a more thorough ‘pacifi­
cation’ of the Falmouth area is evident in the report. 
Mowat complained that the lack of a sufficient number 
of troops prevented his making an effective sweep of 
arms, ammunition and livestock in Casco Bay.119
Lieutenant Mowat’s flotilla arrived in Boston harbor on 
the second day of November. Upon receiving Mowat’s 
report, Admiral Graves seemed only mildly disappointed 
that deficiencies in the artillery stores and the condition 
of the ships had limited his ambitious coastal expedition 
to the destruction of only one town. Graves was genuine­
ly proud of Mowat’s accomplishment and attached great­
er significance to the results of the operation than was 
warranted. He proclaimed that the destruction of the 
town was a severe “Stroke to the Rebels, Falmouth hav­
ing long been a principal Magazine of all Kinds of mer­
chandize, from whence besides supplying the scattered 
Villages in . . . New Hampshire and Massachusetts Bay, 
large Quantities of Goods were . transported ... to 
Newbury7 Port and from thence by land to the Rebel 
Army around Boston.” Graves promised the Admiralty 
Office that other pacifying expeditions would follow and 
that he would “not allow the Rebels to remain quiet.”120
But the Falmouth affair was the last of such operations 
for Admiral Samuel Graves. Winter approached, and 
with it came news of Graves’ dismissal from command 
of the North American Squadron. Lord Sandwich could 
not appease the critics who called for Graves’ removal. 
Admiral Graves’ attempt to answer the critics—the east- 
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em New England coastal expedition—came too late to 
save his command.
The destruction of Falmouth received wide and ex­
tensive coverage in the American press.121 Throughout 
the colonies editors copied and printed two or three ac­
counts of the affair from paper to paper. The most popu­
lar and complete account appeared in the 19 October is­
sue of the New England Chronicle of Salem, Massachu­
setts. This version summarized events preceding the de­
struction, the bombardment itself and the extent of dam­
age. Referring to Mowat as an “execrable Monster,” the 
account contained much patriotic rhetoric: “May heaven 
protect an innocent, distressed People; and may their im­
placable Enemies perish in the Fire they [Kindled] for 
others ... no Mercy is to be expected from our savage 
Enemies.”122 Several papers printed verbatim Mowat’s 
communication to the people of Falmouth, while others 
carried brief sketches of the bombardment written by 
Pearson Jones, a Falmouth resident.123
Extant private correspondence indicates that the Fal­
mouth affair was a matter of some discussion among 
revolutionary leaders. George Washington termed Fal­
mouth’s destruction “an Outrage exceeding in Barbarity 
& Cruelty every hostile Act practised among civilized 
Nations.”124 In mid-November Washington stated that 
the Falmouth affair attested to the existence of “diabol­
ical designs of [the British] Administration to prosecute 
with unrelenting Fury, the most cruel, and savage war 
that ever a Civilized Nation engaged in . . . .”125 Gener­
al Nathaniel Green, roused to great indignation because 
of Admiral Graves’ action, proclaimed in classic revolu­
tionary rhetoric: “Fight or be slaves!”126
John Adams, then attending the Continental Congress 
in Philadelphia, received numerous letters commenting 
on Falmouth’s destruction. James Warren told Adams 
that Admiral Graves’ action in ordering the coastal 
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expedition was in his estimation the last straw in a long 
succession of abuses: “What can we wait for now? What 
more can we want to justifie any step to take, kill and de­
stroy, to refuse them any refreshments, to apprehend our 
enemies, to confiscate their goods and estates, to open 
our ports to foreigners, and if practicable to form alli­
ances . . . ”127 Essentially, Warren considered the de­
struction of Falmouth and Graves’ order for similar treat­
ment of other New England coastal towns as a frank Brit­
ish declaration of war and suggested that the colonies re­
act accordingly, even hinting at American independence.
Josiah Quincy, William Tudor and Reverend William 
Gordon, acquaintances of Adams, shared similar senti­
ments in their correspondence with him. Quincy saw Fal­
mouth’s destruction as a demonstration of Britain’s inten­
tion “to execute . unrelenting Vengeance by every 
Means in their Power.”128 Tudor passionately proclaimed 
that popular opinion demanded that the colonies “throw 
open . . . [their] Ports wide to all the World .... If 
we must be Slaves, Let us be the slaves of Francef,] 
Spain[,] Turkey, rather than slaves of ungrateful Bri­
tain.”129 Gordon pointedly asked Adams how many more 
towns were to be sacrificed to “the British Barbarians” 
before the Continental Congress made “every exertion of 
power & wisdom . in opposing . . . [its] Enemies.130
A Salem woman, Elizabeth Smith, most perceptively 
evaluated American reaction to the Falmouth affair 
when she questioned whether the British really thought 
that actions such as Falmouth’s destruction could ever 
serve to reconcile the colonies with the metropolitan gov­
ernment. She expressed her profound doubts as to wheth­
er it was possible to believe Britain’s claims of being de­
sirous of reconciliation, when such a “Wonton abuse of 
Minnisterial power [is] exerted against Mil­
lions . . who are condemned unheard . . . ”131
The burning of Falmouth resulted in more than mere 
rhetoric. Many seaport communities, particularly those
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along the central New England coast, became very un­
easy, daily expecting a visitation from British naval ves­
sels.132 Portsmouth, New Hampshire, especially feared an 
attack. When rumors circulated that Lieutenant Mowat 
would return to Portsmouth after his squadron repaired 
and resupplied at Boston, many of Portsmouth’s inhabi­
tants transported their possessions safely inland to 
Dover.133 The town petitioned General Washington for 
soldiers and powder, but he could only spare the serv­
ices of Brigadier General John Sullivan, who organized 
Portsmouth’s defenses.134 The inhabitants of Cape Ann 
and Salem reacted in a similar manner. Cape Ann’s resi­
dents went so far as to remove the glass windows from 
their meetinghouse and many dwellings. They fortified 
their harbor, and took measures "to give the enemy a 
warm reception.”135 Salem residents decided to block the 
harbor channel with hulks and repaired the town’s 
forts.136 All along the New England coast defense pre­
parations continued throughout the remainder of 1775. 
By January 1776 British intelligence sources reported that 
all the port towns from Boston to Portsmouth were 
strongly defended, and from Portsmouth to Casco Bay 
"every harbor and Creek has some insignificant Re­
doubt, Logwall or other defence, and upon the least 
alarm, the Country people came in . . . .”137
British reaction to the destruction of Falmouth was 
both mild and unbelieving. First news of the affair 
reached England in mid-December 1775. Since these re­
ports originated from colonial sources, many Britishers 
viewed it as revolutionary propaganda or, if true, as justi­
fied by the circumstances.138 The editor of Gentlemen s 
Magazine refused to comment on the matter until it was 
authenticated but added that "it cannot be true, or the 
reasons for this severe order are concealed.”139 French 
sources stated that English gazettes placed the Falmouth 
affair in the context of the particular circumstances lead­
ing to Graves’ orders.140 Admiral Graves’ official report 
did not arrive at the Admiralty Office until the first of 
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January 1776,141 and it apparently satisfied the major Brit­
ish periodicals, for they printed nothing more on the mat­
ter. Lord George Germain, the new Colonial Office 
Secretary, however, raised the question as to whether 
Graves was justified in destroying the town. Germain de­
manded an explanation from General William Howe, 
who had replaced Gage as overall commander of British 
forces in North America. Thomas Hutchinson mentioned 
in his diary that Lord Germain stated that Admiral 
Graves had been admonished about his “remissness” in 
failing to command his forces vigorously and that Ger­
main imagined Graves would “run to the other ex­
treme.”142 But even this critic remained silent once he re­
ceived General W illiam Howe’s factual account of the 
affair.143
The French government, which carefully watched 
every development in the widening Anglo-American con­
flict, was highly critical of the Falmouth affair.144 Count 
de Guines, the French ambassador in London, informed 
French Foreign Minister Vergennes of the town’s destruc­
tion on 22 December 1775.145 About one week later Ver­
gennes replied that such an action was “absurd as well as 
barbaric” on Britain’s part, especially since Graves intend­
ed to burn all the major maritime communities to the 
eastward of Boston. The Foreign Minister asserted that 
the destruction of Falmouth could conceivably be under­
stood as an act of “furious and boundless despair” had 
the British resolved to abandon the colonies. But since he 
knew that Britain intended to send a large army to Amer­
ica to pacify the colonies, the destruction of the New 
England coastal towns would only destroy places for 
shelter and storehouses which were essential if the British 
desired to penetrate into the countryside.146 The French, 
therefore, regarded Graves’ coastal bombardment 
scheme as a strategic absurdity.
As a demonstration of the quandary of British imperial 
policy formulation and implementation, the destruction 
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of Falmouth was significant from a strategic point of 
view. Admiral Graves’ attempt to pacify the central New 
England coast by what could be regarded as strategic 
naval bombardment was a unique case. Graves intended 
that the Navy would destroy the morale of the coastal 
population by leveling their towns. Falmouth never real­
ly recovered during the course of the Revolution, and 
the town still looked like a ruin in 1781.147 But like recent 
attempts at strategic morale bombardment from the air, 
Graves’ plan produced the opposite effect. Far from sur­
rendering or abandoning their revolutionary zeal, the in­
habitants of Falmouth petitioned General Washington for 
troops and defensive supplies to protect the remnant of 
the town. They also made known their determination “to 
Exert the Utmost of their power in the Great cause in 
which all America is . Engag’d.”148 The Royal Navy’s 
strategic bombardment only generated increased hostil­
ity and resolve to resist to the end.
The Falmouth affair therefore contributed to the de­
sire for independence from Britain. As early as one week 
after the town’s destruction some colonists remarked that 
independence was now necessary. Writing on 12 No­
vember, a prominent Portsmouth resident, William 
Whipple, stated that news of Falmouth’s destruction and 
the threat of similar measures caused “everyone to risque 
his all in Support of his Liberties & privileges . the 
unheard of cruelties of the enemy have so effectually uni­
fied us that I believe there are not four persons now in 
Portsmouth who do not justify the measures persuing in 
opposition to the Tyranny of Great Britain.”149 An article 
in the 23 November issue of the New England Chronicle 
eloquently connected the Falmouth affair with the need 
to break with England:
The savage and brutal barbarity of our enemies in burning Fal­
mouth, is a full demonstration that there is not the least remains of vir­
tue, wisdom, or humanity in the British court; and that they are fully 
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determined with fire and sword, to butcher and destroy, beggar and 
enslave the whole American people. Therefore we expect soon to 
break off all kinds of connection with Britain, and form into a Grand 
Republic of the American Colonies, which will, by the blessing of 
heaven, soon work out our salvation, and perpetuate the liberties, in­
crease the wealth, the power and the glory of this Western world.150
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